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A PrObLem FOr HASker: FreeDOm wITH 
reSPecT TO THe PreSeNT, HArD FAcTS, AND 
THeOLOgIcAL INcOmPATIbILISm
michael rota
In God, Time, and Knowledge, william Hasker presents a powerful argument 
against “theological compatibilism,” which, in this context, refers to the view 
that divine foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian free will. In this pa-
per I show that Hasker’s views on free will, as expressed in God, Time, and 
Knowledge, are inconsistent with his own account of hard facts. I then con-
sider four ways to remove the inconsistency and argue that the first two are 
untenable for the libertarian, while the remaining two leave the theological 
compatibilist in a good position to respond to the dilemma of freedom and 
foreknowledge. Along the way, I attempt to defuse Hasker’s argument that 
Anselmian eternalism is “fatal to libertarian free will.”
I. Introduction
In several recent publications,1 katherin rogers has argued that god’s 
timeless knowledge of actions that are future with respect to us is per-
fectly compatible with some of those actions being free, in the liber-
tarian sense. Her strategy for making this argument involves asking 
whether the past or eternity is any more fixed than the present. In this 
paper I use a related strategy to reveal an inconsistency between wil-
liam Hasker’s views on free will and his own account of hard facts. I 
then consider four ways to remove the inconsistency and argue that 
the first two are untenable for the libertarian, while the remaining two 
leave the theological compatibilist in a good position to respond to the 
dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge. Along the way, I attempt to de-
fuse Hasker’s argument that Anselmian eternalism is “fatal to libertarian 
free will.”2
1katherin rogers, Anselm on Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), chapter 
9; k. rogers, “Anselmian eternalism: The Presence of a Timeless god,” Faith and Philosophy 
24.1 (January 2007), pp. 3–27; and k. rogers, “The Necessity of the Present and Anselm’s 
eternalist response to the Problem of Theological Fatalism,” Religious Studies 43.1 (march 
2007), pp. 25–47.
2william Hasker, “The Absence of a Timeless god,” in God and Time: Essays on the Divine 
Nature, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), p. 197.
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II. The Problem
In God, Time, and Knowledge, Hasker employs a robust libertarian notion of 
free will, providing the following as a “formal definition of this notion”:
(Fw) N is free at T with respect to performing A =df It is in N’s power 
at T to perform A, and it is in N’s power at T to refrain from per-
forming A.3
In the course of clarifying this definition, Hasker notes that
the power in question is the power to perform a particular act under given cir-
cumstances, and not a generalized power to perform acts of a certain kind. 
(Thus, if Thomas has the skill to perform on the parallel bars, but at T1 his 
arms are tied behind his back, we shall say that he lacks the power at T1 to 
perform on the parallel bars.) In general, if it is in N’s power at T to perform 
A, then there is nothing in the circumstances that obtain at T which prevents 
or precludes N’s performing A at T. Here “prevent” applies especially to cir-
cumstances that are causally incompatible with N’s performing A at T, and 
“preclude” to circumstances that are logically incompatible with N’s doing 
so. (The tied hands prevent Thomas from performing on the parallel bars; he 
is precluded from marrying edwina at T by the fact that at that time she is 
already married to someone else.)
In a footnote, Hasker raises the question of what counts as a circumstance. 
His answer: “the circumstances that obtain at T include all and only the 
hard facts with respect to T.”4
The third sentence in the block quotation above implies that
(1) If it is in N’s power at T to perform A, then there is nothing in the 
circumstances that obtain at T which precludes N’s performing A 
at T.
So Hasker is committed to (1). But anyone committed to (1) is surely also 
committed to:
(2) If it is in N’s power at T to refrain from performing A, then there is 
nothing in the circumstances that obtain at T which precludes N’s 
refraining from performing A at T.
Now, suppose that at a time T an agent N freely performs the act of choos-
ing to get out of bed. (That’s not to say that N gets out of bed at T—that 
takes some time. rather, it’s N’s choice that occurs at T.) Since Hasker him-
self thinks that humans do have libertarian free will, he should grant that 
this is a possible situation.
Letting A refer to the act of choosing to get out of bed, then, we are sup-
posing that at T, N freely performs A. In Hasker’s turn of phrase, N is free 
at T with respect to performing A. By his definition of free will, (FW), it 
follows that
3william Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: cornell University Press, 1989), p. 66. 
4Hasker, GTK, p. 67, n. 4, italics in original.
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(3)  It is in N’s power at T to refrain from choosing to get out of bed
and
(4) It is in N’s power at T to choose to get out of bed.
Next, let P be the proposition that N chooses at T to get out of bed. On 
the account of hard facts that Hasker gives in God, Time, and Knowledge, 
P counts as a hard fact with respect to T. That is, it is a hard fact with re-
spect to T that N chooses at T to get out of bed. Proof: what Hasker calls 
“elementary propositions” include those “propositions that say of some 
individual that it has a certain property. . . . These propositions may be 
tensed, or they may be tenseless propositions indexed to a time.”5 So “N 
chooses at T to get out of bed,” i.e., “at T, N chooses to get out of bed” is 
an elementary proposition; it is a tenseless proposition indexed to a time 
that says of N that N has the property of choosing-to-get-out-of-bed at 
that time.
Next, Hasker asserts that
(H1) An elementary proposition is future-indifferent IFF it is concep-
tually consistent with there being no times after the present, and 
also with there being times after the present.6
“N chooses at T to get out of bed” is therefore a future-indifferent proposi-
tion. And, by our supposition, it is true. but according to Hasker, “(H5) Any 
future-indifferent proposition that is true is a hard fact,”7 so “N chooses at 
T to get out of bed” is a hard fact, according to Hasker’s account.8
Note further that, at T, it can be truly asserted that P is a future-indif-
ferent proposition that is true. That is: at T, P is a true future-indifferent 
proposition. It follows that at T, P is a hard fact. So P is a hard fact with 
respect to T.
Since the circumstances that obtain at T include all and only the hard 
facts with respect to T, it follows that the circumstances that obtain at T 
include P.
And now for the problem: P, the proposition that N chooses at T to get 
out of bed, logically precludes N’s refraining from choosing at T to get 
out of bed. (It is logically impossible that both P and the proposition “N 
5Hasker, GTK, p. 84.
6Ibid., p. 88.
7Hasker, gTk, p. 89. In the 1998 paperback edition of God, Time, and Knowledge, Hasker 
makes one correction to his account of hard facts (note 15 on p. 88), but that correction (which 
has to do with the classification of truth-functional propositions as future-indifferent) does 
not affect any of his claims which I’ve reproduced here. And, indeed, all the quotations from 
GTK which I include in this paper are present in the 1998 edition as well as the 1989 edition. 
8It may be worth noting that when Hasker first mentions the category of future-indiffer-
ent propositions, he describes them as “propositions that are wholly about the past and the 
present [perhaps he means the past and/or the present—mr], and that are such that their 
truth or falsity cannot be affected by anything that happens in the future” (p. 83). On this 
description we also get the result that “N chooses at T to get out of bed” is at T a future-
indifferent proposition, and thus a hard fact.
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refrains from choosing at T to get out of bed” are true.) So there is some-
thing in the circumstances that obtain at T (namely, P) which precludes N’s 
refraining from choosing at T to get out of bed. with (2), this implies that
(5)  It is not in N’s power at T to refrain from choosing to get out of bed.
but (5) contradicts (3). So Hasker’s own views, together with plausible as-
sumptions, entail a contradiction.
Let me put things in another way: I contend that Hasker’s views as 
expressed in God, Time, and Knowledge are inconsistent. why so? because 
Hasker’s statements in God, Time, and Knowledge commit him to the follow-
ing four propositions:
(Fw) N is free at T with respect to performing A =df It is in N’s power at 
T to perform A, and it is in N’s power at T to refrain from perform-
ing A
(2) If it is in N’s power at T to refrain from performing A, then there is 
nothing in the circumstances that obtain at T which precludes N’s 
refraining from performing A at T
(6) If an agent N performs A at T, then “N performs A at T” is included 
in the circumstances that obtain at T
and,
(7) For some human agent N, some act A, and some time T, N per-
forms A at T, and N is free at T with respect to performing A.
but these four propositions jointly entail a contradiction. For Fw and (7) 
imply that
(8) It is in N’s power at T to refrain from performing A.
And since (7) implies that “N performs A at T,” (7), (6) and (2) jointly im-
ply that
(9) It is not in N’s power at T to refrain from performing A.
I said above that Hasker’s statements commit him to (Fw), (2), (6), and 
(7), but I’ve not yet provided support for my claim that Hasker is commit-
ted to (7). Let me do so now. being a libertarian of the most robust sort, 
Hasker is of course committed to the view that,
(10) For some human agent N, some act A, and some time T, N is free 
at T with respect to performing A.
Surprisingly, though, (10) by itself is not enough to entail (7). For (7) re-
quires that N is free at T with respect to an action done at T, whereas (10)’s 
claim that “N is free at T with respect to performing A” could be satisfied, 
one might think, merely by its being the case that “N is free at T with re-
spect to an action A performed at a later time T2.” Suppose, for example, 
that it is in N’s power at T to perform A at T2 (for example, it is in my 
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power now to raise my hand in a moment), and it is within N’s power at T 
to refrain from performing A at T2. Then, (Fw) could be read as implying 
that N is free at T with respect to performing A at T2. (Fw, as formulated, 
does not require that T be the time at which A is performed.)
So, for all I’ve shown so far, Hasker’s view of freedom could be this: (7) 
is false, but
(7)* For some human agent N, some act A, and times T1 < T2, N per-
forms A at T2, and N is free at T1 with respect to performing A at 
T2
is true; and it’s merely in virtue of (7)* that (10) is true.
On this view of libertarian freedom, we can be free before we do an act, 
but not while we are doing that act.
In fact, however, some of Hasker’s clarificatory statements show that 
this isn’t his view, and that he does accept (7). For example, after intro-
ducing (Fw) he writes, “In general, if it is in N’s power at T to perform A, 
then there is nothing in the circumstances that obtain at T which prevents 
or precludes N’s performing A at T.”9 Here we are asked to conceive of a 
situation in which N has a power at T to perform A, and we are told that 
in such a situation nothing prevents N from performing A at T, that very 
same time at which N is said to have the power. So Hasker is using the 
phrase “it is in N’s power at T to perform A” in a context where T is also 
the time at which A is to occur. given this, it’s fair to assume that when 
Hasker uses the same phrase “It is in N’s power at T to perform A” in (Fw), 
just one page earlier, he is thinking of a case (or at least will allow a case) in 
which the act A is performed at that very time, T, and not some later time. 
So Hasker’s statements in God, Time, and Knowledge do seem to imply (7).
III. Ways of Removing the Inconsistency by  
Adjusting the Account of Freedom
Hasker could remove the inconsistency in his views by adjusting his ac-
count of freedom in such a way as to deny either (7) or (Fw). To consider 
the plausibility of these approaches, I’ll begin by considering some ques-
tions about the precise time at which one has a power to do or not do some 
action. Suppose an agent N does A at T, and consider the following line 
of thought:
while doing A at T, N doesn’t have the power (at T) to refrain from do-
ing A at T. For by the time T is present, N is doing A. but given this, N 
cannot at T exercise a power to refrain from doing A—it’s just too late 
for that. And if N cannot exercise at T a power to refrain from doing A 
at T, then (given what is meant by ‘power’ in this discussion)10 N does 
not have at T a power to refrain from doing A at T.
9Hasker, GTK, p. 67, italics mine.
10Ibid. Nothing of consequence hangs on this choice of what is meant by ‘power.’ If a dif-
ferent definition of power were used (one on which a person can be said to have at a given 
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Suppose one accepted the conclusion of this argument: for any human 
agent N doing any act A at a time T, N does not have at T the power to 
refrain from doing A at T. Then one might go either of two ways with 
respect to the question, “Is N free at T with respect to doing A at T?” One 
might take the view that, since freedom is present only when the power 
to do otherwise is present, N is not free at T with respect to doing A at T. 
This would be to deny (7), and on this view freedom would extend only 
to the future, and not to the present. Or, one might take the view that 
even though N does not have at T the power to refrain from doing A at 
T, N could still be free at T with respect to doing A at T, so long as some 
appropriate condition obtained, e.g., so long as just prior to T, it was in 
N’s power to not do A at T, and the fact that N did do A at T rather than 
not was due to N (i.e., up to N, in N’s control). This would involve accept-
ing (7), but would require an adjustment to (Fw). I’ll now explore both 
of these options as ways one might approach the inconsistency between 
(Fw), (2), (6), and (7).
III.A. Denying (7)
Take first the view that no human agent N is free at T with respect to an act 
A performed at T, that is, ~(7). To my mind, the strategy of removing the 
inconsistency in Hasker’s views by denying (7) is intuitively implausible. 
For to deny (7) is to assert that no human being has ever done anything 
at any time, such that he or she was free with respect to it (the something 
done) when he or she was doing it. If (7) is false, then for every act I have 
ever performed, it is false that I was free with respect to that act while I was 
performing it.
Still, this way of understanding libertarian freedom is not without prec-
edent in the history of thought. Suarez considers the question, “Does a 
free cause have actual freedom while it is operating or before it operates?” 
and reports that
Ockham, gabriel, and other nominalists teach that with respect to an act 
that it is already exercising, the will is not free at the very instant at which it 
exercises that act, except either in the sense that (i) the act proceeds from the 
freedom and indifference that the will had immediately before that instant 
or in the sense that (ii) at the instant in question the will has the power to 
desist from the act in the time immediately following that instant, even if all 
the other conditions or causes that concur for the act persist. . . . The master 
[Peter Lombard] seems to embrace this position in Sentences 2, dist. 25, chap. 
2, where he says that free choice has to do not with the present or the past 
but with the future.11
time a power which he or she can’t exercise at that time), then the focus of the larger discus-
sion would simply shift from the question of whether god’s knowledge of the future rules 
out our ability to do otherwise, to the question of whether god’s knowledge of the future 
rules out our ability to exercise a power to do otherwise.
11Francisco Suarez, On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19 (hereaf-
ter Dm), trans. A. J. Freddoso (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), dispu-
tation 19.9.1. Suarez cites Ockham’s Sentences commentary, book one, distinction 38.
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For those who don’t agree that denying (7) is intuitively implausible, 
I’ll now give an argument in support of (7), inspired by Suarez.12 The argu-
ment is an argument by cases, and I should like to begin with the disjunc-
tion: either presentism is true or presentism is false. but to avoid issues 
concerning the question of whether divine eternity is compatible with pre-
sentism, I’ll instead start with this: either (a) nothing created exists except 
what is temporally present, or not (a). Now, assume for reductio that ~(7), 
i.e., that
(11) For any human agent N who performs an act A at some time T, N 
is not free at T with respect to doing A at T.
Next, if N is not free at T with respect to doing A at T, then it seems that 
we should say that A is not a free act at T. (If A were a free act at T, then N 
would be performing a free act at T, and it would make little sense to say 
that N was not free at T with respect to the free act he or she was perform-
ing at T.) So we have
(12) For any act A which N performs at T, A is not a free act at T.
Suppose now that (a) is true. Since no non-existent act has any proper-
ties, no non-existent act has the property of being a free act. So if there is 
a free human act, it must be an act that exists. but, since—given (a)—the 
only existing human acts are acts occurring at the present, a free human 
act will exist only if there is a presently occurring human act that is free. 
but from (12) we have it that no human act occurring at T can be a free act 
at T. So no presently occurring human act is a free act at the present. And 
no presently occurring human act can be free at some other time, for that 
other time exists only when it is the present time, and when it is the pres-
ent time, the act will not be free (on the view under consideration).13 Thus, 
given (a), (11) appears to imply that there are no free human acts.
Second, suppose (a) is false. Then, for some human act A that occurs at 
T2, there is no reason not to say that at T1 (a time before A is occuring), A 
exists. This is not to say that A exists-at-T1, it’s just to say that at T1 it can 
be truly asserted that A exists simpliciter. (compare: In minnesota, “cali-
fornia exists” is true, but that’s not to say that “calfornia exists-in-minne-
sota.”) So we are supposing that human acts occurring at many times all 
exist simpliciter, though they don’t all exist now.
From (12), it follows that A is not free at T2. might it be free at some 
other time? Anyone who denies that an act can be free while it is occur-
ring will also deny that an act is free after it has occurred. So the question 
to consider is whether A might be free at a time before it is occurring, T1. 
Towards answering this question, consider that A doesn’t exist-at-T1. It 
seems to me that this implies that A doesn’t have properties-at-T1, even 
12Dm 19.9.1 and 19.9.3.
13This line in the argument is included to close off the possibility that while no act A oc-
curring at T is a free act at T, it might be (at T) a free act-at-T2.
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if, as on ~(a), it can be truly said at T1 that A has properties simpliciter. 
my funeral exists, on ~(a), but it doesn’t exist now, and, I would think, it 
doesn’t have properties now, even if it does have properties simpliciter. my 
funeral, for example, is not sad now, even if it is sad, period. but if that’s 
right, then neither would A have the property of being free at T1. So it ap-
pears that there is no time T such that A is free-at-T.
could it be that A is nonetheless free simpliciter? That would be strange, 
given that there is no time at which A is free at that time. relying on the 
assumption that a temporal event cannot have a property simpliciter unless 
it has that property at some time, I conclude that A could not be free in any 
sense. So, given ~(a), (11) seems to imply that there are no free human acts.
Thus, either way, (11) seems to imply that there are no free human acts, 
period. And that, on the face of it, is something a libertarian cannot accept. 
This is a reason for libertarians to reject this view, and to accept (7).14
I’ll now argue that those who believe that god is timelessly eternal 
have a second reason to be dubious about (11).15 Suppose, as do many 
traditional christian theists, that god is timelessly eternal and that god 
is free with respect to the act of willing creatures to exist. (god might not 
have created the world.) but if god can be free with respect to His act of 
willing creatures to exist, then the nature of freedom as such does not pro-
hibit that an agent be free with respect to an act while doing that act. For 
god is free with respect to willing creatures to exist while (in the eternal 
present) He is willing creatures to exist. And if the nature of freedom does 
not prohibit that an agent be free with respect to an act while performing 
that act, then the person who asserts (11) will be left with the question of 
why this is prohibited in the human case. In the absence of a satisfying an-
swer to this question or a good argument for (11), the proponent of divine 
eternity should, it seems to me, affirm (7), because of the analogy with the 
divine case, and should be unimpressed by any arguments against theo-
logical compatibilism that rely on a denial of (7).
As for the argument offered in support of (11), the proponent of divine 
eternity will find at least one of its inferences dubious. That argument had 
the following structure (where N does A at T):
 (13) At T, N is already doing A.
Thus (14) At T, N cannot go back and undo the fact that she or he is 
doing A at T.
14There are replies that a libertarian of Ockham’s sort could give here. Perhaps framing 
the issue in terms of whether or not there are free acts is misguided—perhaps the right way 
to think about libertarian freedom is not in terms of whether or not a given actual act has 
the property of being free, but in terms of whether or not an agent has the power to do some 
act at the next instant and the power to refrain from doing it at the next instant. On this way 
of framing things, one might say that while there are no free human acts (if one insists on 
speaking in that way), this is not a problem for the libertarian. For it could still be the case 
that, for example, N was, at a time before T, free to do A at T. I’ll leave it to others to work out 
how this view might go.
15my argument here is also modeled on an argument of Suarez’s, at Dm 19.9.5.
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Thus (15) For any human agent N who performs an act A at some time 
T, N does not have at T the power to refrain from doing A at 
T.
Thus (11) For any human agent N who performs an act A at some time 
T, N is not free at T with respect to doing A at T.
The divine eternalist will reject the inference from (14) to (11), because he 
will reject this parallel reasoning:
 (14)* In the eternal present, god cannot go back and undo the fact 
that He is willing creatures to exist.
Thus (15)* god does not have in the eternal present the power to re-
frain from willing creatures to exist.
Thus (11)* god is not free in the eternal present with respect to willing 
creatures to exist.
To sum up this sub-section: (i) denying (7) will require the libertarian to 
deny that there are any free human acts, and (ii) the denial of (7) is unmo-
tivated for the divine eternalist.
III.b. modifying (FW)
A second option is to take the view that, where N does A at T, even though 
N does not have at T the power to refrain from doing A at T, N could still 
be free at T with respect to doing A at T. This would be to retain (7), but 
deny that
(16) For some human agent N, act A, and time T, N performs A at T, 
and N has the power at T to refrain from performing A at T.
This will require a modification of
(Fw) N is free at T with respect to performing A =df It is in N’s power 
at T to perform A, and it is in N’s power at T to refrain from per-
forming A.
For, by retaining (7), we are accepting that there is an N who performs A 
at T and is free at T with respect to performing A. but if N is free at T with 
respect to performing A then, if (Fw) is true, it is in N’s power at T to re-
frain from performing A (which, recall, was done at T). And to deny (16) is 
precisely to deny that such a situation ever occurs. So if we accept (7) and 
deny (16), we need a definition of free will other than (FW).
If we can find a suitable replacement for (FW), it is possible that the in-
consistency in Hasker’s views could be removed. but what exactly should 
(Fw) be replaced with? given that free will plays such a crucial role in the 
arguments over theological compatibilism, Hasker will need some account 
of free will to work with. In the course of his arguments against theological 
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compatibilism, Hasker relies on claims like this one: clarence is free with 
respect to his act of eating an omelet only if clarence has a power to refrain 
from eating that omelet.16 In God, Time, and Knowledge, it is (Fw) that sup-
plies such claims. So to make his arguments work in the absence of (Fw), 
Hasker will need some other general claim of the form “If an agent is free 
with respect to A, then _______,” where the _______ makes some reference 
to powers.
An initial suggestion might be this:
(Fw.a) If N is free at T with respect to performing A at T, then there is 
some continuous time interval from T0 up to but not including T 
such that (a) It was in N’s power at all those times (in the inter-
val) to perform A, and (b) It was in N’s power at all those times 
(in the interval) to refrain from performing A.
This is inadequate, however, because the clauses (a) and (b) do not specify 
the time of the performance of A. Our replacement of (Fw) needs to ac-
commodate ~(16), the claim that no one who does A at T can have a power 
at T to refrain from doing A at T. but anyone who denies that it is possible 
for someone who does A at T to have a power at T to refrain from doing A 
at T would also have to deny that it is possible for someone who refrains 
from doing A at T* to have a power at T* to do A at T*. Let T* be in the in-
terval from T0 up to but not including T. Then, given that during the inter-
val in question N is not yet doing A, the person who denies (16) will have 
to hold that N does not have the power at any given time in the interval to 
do A at that time. So the person who denies (16) cannot interpret clause (a) 
to mean “It was in N’s power at each time T* in the interval to perform A 
at T*.” Thus, the person who denies (16) will have to interpret clause (a) to 
mean “It was in N’s power at each time T* in the interval to perform A at 
T.” we might therefore replace (Fw.a) with:
(Fw.b) If N is free at T with respect to performing A at T, then there is 
some continuous time interval from T0 up to but not including 
T such that (a) It was in N’s power at all those times (in the in-
terval) to perform A at T, and (b) It was in N’s power at all those 
times (in the interval) to refrain from performing A at T.
On this account, the following can all be true: N performs A at T, N is 
free at T with respect to performing A at T, and it is not the case that N has 
the power at T to refrain from performing A at T. Hasker could thus retain 
(7), deny (16), and adopt (Fw.b). And if he did so, he would avoid the 
inconsistency outlined in section II. This is so because, while (Fw) and (7) 
imply that (8), (Fw.b) and (7) do not. On this view, we accept (9), but are 
under no compulsion to accept the contradictory proposition (8).
16As in the final inference of Hasker’s main argument for incompatibilism: “(B7) There-
fore, it is not in clarence’s power to refrain from having a cheese omelet for breakfast tomor-
row. (From 5,6) So clarence’s eating the omelet tomorrow is not an act of free choice” (GTK, 
p. 69).
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but let’s take a close look at (Fw.b). According to (Fw.b), one can be 
said to have a power now to do something in the future—one can have 
forward-looking powers, so to speak. what are the conditions necessary 
for having such a forward-looking power? Suppose at T* < T, some ante-
cedent condition necessary for N’s doing A is absent, e.g., suppose N is 
unconscious at T*. but suppose also that N will in fact be conscious by T 
(or, more generally, that the missing condition will be present at T). Does 
N have at T* the power to do A at T? It seems to me that the answer should 
be yes. what’s more, the defender of (Fw.b) needs to say that the answer 
is yes, since otherwise we can construct a counterexample to (Fw.b): Sup-
pose we answer no, and say that if at T* an antecedent condition necessary 
for N’s doing A is absent, then N lacks at T* the power to do A at T (even if 
the condition will be present at T). Now suppose17 I’m deliberating about 
a choice from 10 minutes before T until 1 millisecond before T. god then 
freezes my intellect, from 1 millisecond before T up until (but not includ-
ing) T, so that in the interval from 1 millisecond before T up until (but not 
including) T, an antecedent condition necessary for my doing A is absent. 
Then we will have to say that I do not have at T* the power to do A at T. 
But suppose God unfreezes me at T (so that T is the first moment of my 
being unfrozen), and I freely engage in an act of choice at T. This seems 
possible, but it is a counterexample to (Fw.b), because it is a situation in 
which I am free at T with respect to performing A at T, without there being 
a continuous time interval preceding T of the sort required by (Fw.b).
So it appears that when it comes to the question of whether or not a per-
son N has at T* < T a power to do A at T, what matters is (at least mainly) 
how things are at T.18 Let’s now consider another case. Suppose that at T* 
all is well with N’s faculties, but that god wills that N lose consciousness 
at T, so that at T god causes it to be the case that N cannot do A at T (by 
causing it to be the case at T that N lacks an antecedent condition neces-
sary for N’s doing A at T). Shall we say that N has at T* a power to do A at 
T? No, for N will not in fact be able to do A at T, so we should not say that 
N has a power to do A at T. If what matters when it comes to the question 
of whether or not N has at T* a power to do A at T is how things are at T, 
and things at T are such that N is unable to do A at T, then we should say 
that N does not have at T* a power to do A at T. more generally, if an ante-
cedent condition necessary for N’s doing A at T will in fact be absent at T, 
then we should say that N does not have at T* a power to do A at T.
And now we reach a problem for (Fw.b). The absence at T of an an-
tecedent condition necessary for N’s doing A at T implies that N doesn’t 
have the power at T* < T to do A at T. by parity of reasoning, the absence at 
T of an antecedent condition necessary for N’s refraining from doing A at 
T should imply that N doesn’t have the power at T* to refrain from doing 
17I thank Tom Sullivan for pointing me in this direction.
18I insert “at least mainly” because N would at least have to exist at T* in order to have at 
T* a power to do A at T. So something about how things are at T* will matter for the question 
of whether or not N has at T* a power to do A at T. 
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A at T. but surely N’s having at T the power to refrain from doing A at T 
is an antecedent condition necessary for N’s refraining from doing A at T. 
And the denier of (16) holds that N does not have at T the power to refrain 
from doing A at T. So the denier of (16) must hold that a certain anteced-
ent condition necessary for N’s refraining from doing A at T is absent at 
T. Thus, accepting (Fw.b) has left the denier of (16) with the conclusion 
that N doesn’t have the power at T* to refrain from doing A at T. but since 
T* was a time in the interval from T0 to T, this conclusion implies that no 
agent N who does A at T can satisfy clause (b) of (Fw.b). So, (16) together 
with (Fw.b) imply that no one is ever free.
In the absence, then, of a plausible alternative to (Fw) which (i) is 
compatible with a denial of (16), and (ii) still allows Hasker’s arguments 
against theological compatibilism to go through, this second way of re-
moving the inconsistency will not work.19
IV. An Implication for Hasker’s Argument  
against Anselmian Eternalism
Given the difficulties involved in denying either (7) or (FW), I think a lib-
ertarian should retain both of these propositions. I’ll now argue that doing 
so gives us a reason to reject Hasker’s argument that Anselmian eternal-
ism is “fatal to libertarian free will.”20 In the next section, I’ll return to the 
inconsistency between (Fw), (2), (6), and (7).
Let “Anselmian eternalism” refer to a theory of divine timelessness ac-
cording to which all times (and their contents) are equally real, and are all 
equally present to god.21 On this view, no one time is ontologically privileged 
(as presentists think that the present time is ontologically privileged).
In “The Absence of a Timeless god,” Hasker asserts that Anselmian 
eternalism
destroys libertarian freedom by negating the existence of ‘alternative possi-
bilities’ to the actions that are taken. remember that [on Anselmian eternal-
ism] the future events of the world, including your and my future actions, 
always exist in the timeless eternity of god.22
19An anonymous referee for Faith and Philosophy has suggested that an alternative account 
of free will might help Hasker’s case, namely the account that x is free to do A at t only if (i) 
there is an interval T ending at t during which x has the power to do A, and (ii) there is an 
interval T’ ending at t during which x has the power to refrain from doing A, and (iii) for 
every obstacle or impediment O to doing A, if x has O during some interval T’’ containing t, 
then T’’ ends at t. This suggestion was included along with an account of time according to 
which (a) every action takes place over an interval of time, (b) intervals of time are ontologi-
cally prior to moments, and (c) it is indeterminate whether an action is occurring at the first 
moment of the time interval over which that action takes place.
I think this suggestion is worth careful consideration, but I also think that one can show 
that it will not help Hasker’s case. Unfortunately, length constraints prohibit me from pre-
senting my argument for this conclusion here.
20Hasker, “The Absence of a Timeless god,” p. 197.
21The name “Anselmian eternalism” is due to katherin rogers. See her piece by that title, 
cited in note 1.
22Hasker, “The Absence of a Timeless god,” p. 197. Italics in original.
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After asserting that the existence of one’s future actions is incompatible 
with there being a possibility that one will not engage in those very ac-
tions, Hasker continues:
why, it will be asked, does the fact that my actions are already present in the 
divine eternity entail that those acts are causally determined? The answer is 
that it does not. but causal determination is not the issue. causal determin-
ism is inimical to freedom because it eliminates alternative possibilities for 
the action that is taken. but alternative possibilities can be eliminated in oth-
er ways as well, not least by the fact that the act to be done already exists—
and exists, let us recall, in its full concrete particularity—in eternity.23
Up to the point in his argument which I have just quoted, Hasker’s key 
contention is that
(17) If a human agent N’s future action exists (in its full concrete par-
ticularity) in the divine eternity, then alternative possibilities for 
N’s action at that future time have been eliminated.
Hasker attempts to strengthen his argument with the following observa-
tion:
Previously I pointed out that divine timelessness can be reconciled with lib-
ertarian freedom only if the following proposition is true: there are things that 
God timelessly believes which are such that it is in my power, now, to bring it about 
that God does not timelessly believe those things. given Anselm’s Solution, we 
may add another necessary condition: there are future actions of my own which 
timelessly exist in the divine eternity which are such that it is in my power, now, 
to bring about that those actions do not exist in eternity. Does anyone seriously 
believe that these requirements are satisfied?24
given the context, the point of the rhetorical question at the end of this 
paragraph is to suggest that these requirements are not satisfied. Hasker’s 
argument that Anselmian eternalism destroys libertarian free will de-
pends, then, on three things: the claim I have labeled (17), and the denial 
of the following two propositions:
(18) There are things that god timelessly believes which are such that it 
is in my power, now, to bring it about that god does not timelessly 
believe those things.
(19) There are future actions of my own which timelessly exist in the 
divine eternity which are such that it is in my power, now, to bring 
it about that those actions do not exist in eternity.
23Ibid. pp. 197–198. In his earlier GTK, Hasker had come to the quite different conclusion 
that “divine timelessness does enable us to explain how it is possible that god has compre-
hensive knowledge of our future and yet we ourselves freely determine what, in certain 
respects, that future shall be” (p. 177). by the time of his writing “The Absence of a Time-
less God,” however, he seems to have changed his view. The difference is probably due to 
the distinctive elements of Anselmian eternalism, which Hasker addresses explicitly only in 
“The Absence of a Timeless god.”
24Hasker, “The Absence of a Timeless god,” p. 198.
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However—and now for the main argument of this section—if one ac-
cepts (7) and (Fw), one should not accept (17) or deny (18) or (19). Argu-
ment: (7) asserts that there is some human agent N, some act A, and some 
time T, such that N performs A at T, and N is free at T with respect to per-
forming A. From (Fw) it follows that it is in N’s power at T to refrain from 
performing A (which was done at T). So (7) and (Fw) imply that
(16) For some human agent N, act A, and time T, N performs A at T, 
and N has the power at T to refrain from performing A at T.
Notice that (16) implies that it is in N’s power at T to do something 
(viz., refrain) such that, if N were to do it, the proposition “N performs 
A at T” would be false. And note further that, if N were to refrain, the 
proposition “N performs A at T” would be false because N refrained. So 
(16) implies that
(20) For some agent N who performs A at T, it is in N’s power at T to 
do something (viz., refrain) such that, if N were to do it, then, as a 
consequence, the proposition “N performs A at T” would be false.
why all this fuss about “because” and “as a consequence”? because these 
are Hasker’s own ways to describe what he means by the locution “N 
brings it about that _____.”25 In the sense in which Hasker uses ‘brings 
about,’ (20) implies that
(21) N performs A at T, and yet it is in N’s power at T to bring it about 
that “N performs A at T” is false.
I will now argue that Hasker cannot coherently accept (21) but deny (18) 
and (19). consider the proposition that “N performs A at T.” On Hasker’s 
own assumption that god is in time, when would god know this? Presum-
ably, “N performs A at T” is something that an omniscient temporal god 
would know at T. making the plausible assumption that a temporal god 
would know at T everything that is occurring at T, it follows that the prop-
osition “N performs A at T” is something god believes at T. but by (21), N 
has the power at T to bring it about that that proposition is false. Of course, 
if “N performs A at T” is false in some possible world, then god never 
believes “N performs A at T” in that possible world. So (21) implies that N 
has the power at T to bring it about that god does not at T believe “N per-
forms A at T.” but then, when T is the present moment, it is true that:
(22) Something which god believes in the present (viz., “N performs 
A at T”) is such that it is in N’s power, at the present moment, to 
bring it about that god does not believe that thing at the present 
moment.
25Hasker, GTK, p. 101: “The core idea in the notion of ‘bringing about’ is the notion of 
something’s being the case in consequence of what an agent does. . . .” See also pp. 107–108, 
where Hasker focuses on the fact that a certain proposition “was true because of what” an 
agent did. (Italics in original.)
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but if Hasker accepts (22), then he must also accept that there are times at 
which the following proposition is true:
(18)* There are things that god believes in the temporal present which 
are such that it is in my power, now, to bring it about that god does 
not now believe those things.26
And he must also accept that there are times at which
(19)* There is a present act of my own which exists in the present which 
is such that it is in my power, now, to bring it about that that act 
does not exist in the present.
Now, on what grounds could someone who accepts (18)* and (19)* plau-
sibly deny (18) and (19)? To accept (18)* is to accept that I now have a 
certain sort of power over what god actually and in fact now believes. If 
I can have that power but could not have an analogous power over what 
god actually and in fact timelessly believes, then it must be that what an 
eternal god timelessly believes about what I’m now doing would be less 
up to me (less in my control) than what a temporal god now actually 
believes about what I’m doing now. but I see no reason to think this is so. 
Until such a reason is provided, it seems to me that one who accepts (7) 
and (Fw) cannot plausibly deny (18) and (19).
what of (17)? I’ll now argue that Hasker cannot plausibly accept (17), 
if he accepts (7) and (Fw). we saw earlier that (16) follows from (7) and 
(Fw). It also follows from (7) and (Fw) that it is in N’s power at T to per-
form A at T. Thus, anyone accepting (7) and (Fw) accepts that the follow-
ing propositions are all true: N performs A at T; it is in N’s power at T to 
perform A at T; it is in N’s power at T to refrain from performing A at T. 
Now, the truth of “it is in N’s power at T to perform A at T and it is in N’s 
power at T to refrain from performing A at T” is sufficient for there being 
alternative possibilities for N’s action at T. So anyone accepting both (7) 
and (Fw) should accept that
(23) There are alternative possibilities for N’s action at T.
When is (23) true? At the least, Hasker should admit that it is true at some 
time before T. And perhaps Hasker will allow that (23) is true at T. Let’s 
take each case in turn.
If one admits that (23) is true at T, then one should admit that even 
when N’s action A presently exists (when T is the present moment), alter-
native possibilities for N’s action at T have not been eliminated. but then 
one is accepting that
(24) A human agent N’s present action can exist (in its full concrete par-
ticularity) in the temporal present without its being the case that 
alternative possibilities for N’s action at that present moment have 
been eliminated.
26This point is due to katherin rogers; see her “Anselmian eternalism,” p. 18.
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And if one accepts this, it’s hard to see how one could plausibly insist 
that
(17) If a human agent N’s future action exists (in its full concrete par-
ticularity) in the divine eternity, then alternative possibilities for 
N’s action at that future time have been eliminated.
For, presumably, the main reason to accept (17) is the intuitive appeal of 
the thought that if some act A already exists, then it is fixed in a way that 
rules out the real possibility of its non-occurrence. but someone who ac-
cepts (24) should reject this thought. For to accept (24) is to accept that it is 
possible for some act A to already exist (what is present already exists at 
the present), even though it is not fixed in such a way that the alternative 
possibility of its not occurring has been ruled out.
So, on this first case, Hasker can no longer appeal to (17), and his argu-
ment fails.
On the second case, we suppose that Hasker admits only that (23) is 
true at some time before T, and allows that, when T is the present moment, 
alternative possibilities for N’s action at T have been eliminated. but recall 
that, by (7), N is free at T with respect to performing A. (N is just a name 
we picked for an agent who is free at T with respect to some action A.) So 
if Hasker is to deny that there are alternative possibilities for N’s action at 
T, he has to hold that it is possible for N to be free at T with respect to per-
forming A, despite the fact that, at T, there are no alternative possibilities 
for N’s action at T. And if Hasker accepts that, then he is accepting that the 
elimination of alternative possibilities need not take away freedom. but 
then he can no longer use the proposition
(17) If a human agent N’s future action exists (in its full concrete par-
ticularity) in the divine eternity, then alternative possibilities for 
N’s action at that future time have been eliminated
to reach the conclusion that if a human agent N’s future action exists in 
eternity, then that action must not be free. So, on this second case, too, 
Hasker’s argument will fail.
It appears, then, that Hasker’s argument against Anselmian eternalism 
does not establish its conclusion.
V. Ways of Removing the Inconsistency by  
Focusing on Hard Facts or logical Preclusion
I return now to the inconsistency between (Fw), (2), (6), and (7). I’ll now 
examine the prospects for a theological incompatibilist who denies either 
(6) or (2).
Proposition (6) claims that (where N does A at T), “N performs A at T” 
is included in the circumstances that obtain at T. Since the circumstances 
that obtain at T are precisely the hard facts with respect to T, (6) is equiva-
lent to the claim that, if N does A at T, then “N does A at T” is a hard fact 
with respect to T.
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To make the denial of (6) plausible, one would need to be able to offer 
some explanation of why such a fact as “N does A at T” should not count 
as a hard fact at T. How could one do this?
It won’t help to start with the claim that the past is real (while the future 
is not), since the present is just as real as the past (or more real than the 
past) on any theory of time. Nor will it help to start with the claim that 
the past is ontologically determinate (whereas the future is not), since the 
present is just as ontologically determinate as the past. The world is exact-
ly one particular way at the present, and I take it that ‘being ontologically 
determinate’ is just another way to say ‘being one particular way.’27
what might help is to focus on the distinction between facts that are 
now fixed, in the sense that they are no longer in anyone’s control, and 
those that are not now fixed, in the sense that they are now in someone’s 
control. we consider the fact that Napoleon was defeated at waterloo to 
be a paradigm hard fact precisely because we believe that nothing any 
of us can now do can affect whether or not “Napoleon was defeated at 
waterloo” is a true proposition. whether or not Napoleon was defeated at 
waterloo is not now up to you, me, or any other human being. but all this 
suggests a reason to think “N does A at T” is not a hard fact at T: N’s doing 
A at T is up to someone (namely N), and this is so even at T. (If N could 
speak instantaneously, N could say right at T, “I’m doing A, and it’s up to 
me that I’m doing A.”) So, since “N does A at T” is up to N (i.e., is in N’s 
control) at T, “N does A at T” is not a hard fact at T.
I find this line of thought28 very plausible, and Hasker could adopt it to 
remove the inconsistency in his views. but it is grist for the theological com-
patibilist’s mill, not for Hasker’s. The preceding line of thought relied on the 
claim that if something is up to N at T, then that something is not a hard fact 
at T. but if this is right, then there’s good reason to think that “god eternally 
knows that N does A at T” is not a hard fact at T, either—as I’ll now argue.
Suppose that N does A at T, that god is timelessly eternal, and that it is 
because N does A at T that god eternally knows that N does A at T. Then, 
since N’s doing A at T is up to N at T, the state of affairs of God’s eternally 
believing that N does A at T should also be up to N at T. For if a second 
state of affairs depends on a first, and one has control over the first, then 
one has control over the second.29 And the state of affairs consisting in 
27In another context, Hasker approvingly quotes marilyn Adams’s observation that “if the 
necessity of the past stems from its ontological determinateness it would seem that timeless 
determinateness is just as problematic as past determinateness.” [Hasker quotes this state-
ment of Adams at “The Absence of a Timeless god,” p. 198. The quotation is from marilyn 
Adams, William ockham (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), p. 1135.] To 
the extent that Hasker endorses the view that the necessity of the past does stem from its 
ontological determinateness, he should also endorse the view that the present shares in the 
necessity of the past—for the present is just as ontologically determinate as the past. but then 
all present facts should count as hard facts.
28Inspired by a comment of Thomas Flint’s.
29I’m helped here by Trenton merricks, “Truth and Freedom,” Philosophical Review 118.1 
(2009), p. 42.
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god’s eternally believing that N does A at T does depend on the state of 
affairs consisting of N’s doing A at T. Since N’s doing A at T is up to N at 
T, it follows that god’s eternally believing that N does A at T is also up to 
N at T.30
The most plausible way of denying (6), then, implies that “god eter-
nally knows that N does A at T” is not a hard fact at T. but then the obser-
vation that N’s not doing A at T is logically precluded by “god eternally 
knows that N does A at T” should not make us doubt N’s freedom. even 
if logical preclusion (of our doing otherwise) by hard facts is a problem 
for our freedom, it can’t be that logical preclusion by facts over which we 
now have control is as such a problem for our freedom. I conclude that the 
denial of (6) leaves the divine eternalist in a good position to respond to 
the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge.31
The denial of (2), for its part, is equivalent to giving up on the intuition 
that:
(25) If some fact which is a hard fact long before T logically precludes 
N’s refraining from doing A at T, then N cannot very well have the 
power to refrain from doing A at T.
Anyone denying (2) will therefore think that the following situation is 
epistemically possible: long ago, god believed that N would do A at T, this 
fact precludes N’s refraining from doing A at T, but N still has the power 
to refrain from doing A at T. (That is, mere logical preclusion of alterna-
tives is not in itself a bar to having the power to do otherwise.) but anyone 
who grants that this situation is epistemically possible can respond to the 
dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge as follows:
In the situation just described, it is possible that N still has the power to 
refrain from doing A at T. but if N still has the power to refrain from do-
ing A at T, then N has the power to do something (viz., refrain) such that, 
if N were to do it, then god would not have long ago believed what He 
did in fact long ago believe. Therefore, it is possible that N has the power 
to do something such that, if N were to do it, then god would not have 
30given divine eternity, I think we should say something similar about the case of a 
prophet’s long-ago revelation that N will do A at T. It is up to N whether N does A at T. 
whether an eternal god reveals to a prophet at an earlier time that N will do A at T depends 
on god’s seeing that N does A at T, which in turn depends on N’s doing A at T. So it is up to 
N whether a prophet long ago revealed that N would do A at T. This view requires that we 
could (depending on what prophecies god has revealed) have counterfactual power over 
genuine past events. (It does not, however, require that we have the power to change the 
past.) It seems to me that, of objections to the eternity solution to the dilemma of freedom 
and foreknowledge, the most serious is one raised by questions about our counterfactual 
power over the past. Although this is a worthy topic, length constraints prohibit me from 
discussing it here.
31much the same could be said about the person who believes god is in time—my argu-
ments in the preceding two paragraphs would apply equally well to the proposition “god 
knew, long before T, that N would do A at T,” so long as god knows what will occur because 
it will occur. The divine eternalist has an advantage, however, in being able to explain how it 
could be true at a time that god infallibly knows what will occur in what is the future with 
respect to that time (without causally determining that it occur).
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long ago believed what He did in fact long ago believe. Thus, the person 
who denies (2) should think that it is epistemically possible that we have 
counterfactual power over the past. But this is sufficient for defusing the 
dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge.
VI. Conclusion
I draw two conclusions from the foregoing. First, the account of free will 
and hard facts given in God, Time, and Knowledge is inconsistent, and needs 
to be repaired if Hasker’s arguments for theological incompatibilism are to 
be successful. Second, the most plausible repairs—denying (6) and deny-
ing (2)—leave the theological compatibilist in a good position to respond 
to the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge.32
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